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Abstract
This paper analyses the equilibrium effects of individual information fil-
ters. Information is modelled as advertisements which are distributed across
a population of consumers with heterogeneous preferences. An advertisement
that provides knowledge about a product with little or no utility for a con-
sumer is considered junk. Filters are characterised by their level of tolerance.
The quality of the filter is measured in terms of the share of useful items
in the total set of items passing the filter. It is shown that in conditions of
decentralised competition, multiple equilibria arise. A social optimum can
be achieved by demanding each consumer to reject a certain percentage of
advertisements, leaving the choice of what is rejected up to the consumer
him/herself.
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21 Introduction
The Internet permits distribution of information to a wide range of users. This in-
formation will be always more or less valuable to the user who receives it, however.
For example, a consumer opens his or her mail box. Besides personal letters, the
box will also contain advertisements. Some of the advertisements will describe useful
products, whereas others will be less informative or indeed constitute pure junk for
our particular consumer. In a similar way, more or less useful information is brought
to the attention of consumers as they surf the World Wide Web. The quality of the
service provided by the Internet can be improved through the use of a filter that
focuses on valuable pieces of information and eliminates what is unwanted. This
paper shows that in an information-rich economy, individual filter use generates an
externality that affects other users. The reason is that the use of filters leads to a
change in the equilibrium set of information distributed via the Internet.
In order to analyse the equilibrium effects of filters, I use a model of monopolistic
competition under conditions of limited attention that has already been described
in Falkinger [2008]. In this model, first an infinite mass of firms competes for at-
tention by advertising different variants of a product to consumers with identical
preferences. Then, those firms that succeed in attracting the consumers’ attention
sell their products in conditions of monopolistic price competition. In this paper,
instead of assuming that all products enter the consumer’s utility function in a sym-
metric way, I allow for heterogeneity in products and tastes. A consumer values
information because his or her choices are restricted by the set of products (s)he is
aware of. As Ozga [1960] and Stigler [1961] have pointed out, besides the consumers’
3own search, advertising is the modern method of providing potential buyers with
knowledge of consumption opportunities.1 Of course, informative material provid-
ing knowledge about a highly valued product is more useful to the consumer than
an advertisement for a less valuable product. “Junk” is a subjective notion. It is
modelled as advertisements for less valuable (or useless) products. Since different
consumers may value the same product differently, it is possible that a particular
advertisement will be useless for one consumer and at the same time very useful for
another. And even when consumers have identical preferences, they will still be ex-
posed to some amount of junk – simply because firms are ignorant of the preferences
of consumers in general. This paper shows how a consumer’s utility in equilibrium
depends on the heterogeneity of consumer tastes and the mix of information sup-
plied.2
Traditionally, economists assume that consumers are imperfectly informed because
information distribution is costly and advertisements reach only a fraction of po-
1Obviously, there are other views on this point. For instance, Kaldor [1950-51], emphasises the
persuasive character of advertising (see Bagwell [2007] for a survey of the different views in the
economic literature on advertising). From this point of view, the answer as to why a consumer
obtains little information from advertisements is more or less trivial. Therefore, this paper is based
on the premise that advertising is informative in the sense that knowledge about the identity of
a product is provided. It may still be uninformative in the sense that the advertised product is
useless in the eyes of consumers.
2Here, the analysis is carried out on a model of information about consumption goods. However,
it is worth noting that the structure analysed here can apply to any information about items that
are more or less valuable for a user: for instance, intermediate inputs for manufacturers or sources
of scientific knowledge for researchers, as opposed to consumption goods for households.
4tential consumers (see, e.g., the models by Ozga [1960] and Butters [1977]). This
suggests that advances in information technologies that reduce the cost of infor-
mation and allow distribution of advertisements across a wider range of consumers
should solve the problem. But the effect seems to be quite the opposite. The an-
noyance of being exposed to junk is closely related to the richness of information
distributed to consumers. As Simon [1971] has pointed out, in an information-rich
society, the resource that is scarce is attention. The reason is that a consumer’s
capacity to process information is limited. As long as the consumer has free capac-
ity to evaluate any piece of information supplied, less useful pieces of information
or junk will not distract his or her attention from more useful information. In an
information-rich world, by contrast, the different pieces of information all compete
for the consumer’s attention, and less useful pieces may crowd out the more useful
ones. In this case, the fit of advertised products with consumer preferences – the
quality of information – becomes important. By employing a filter, the consumer
focuses attention on a subset of supplied information. This paper shows that the
quality of this subset depends on the filter used by the individual, but also on the
quality of the pool from which the filtering takes place, that is, on the quality of
the aggregate supply of information. This quality, in turn, cannot be influenced by
the individual consumer’s own filter decisions, rather depends on the average filter
tightness adopted in the population. If many consumers protect themselves against
junk, the incentives to distribute junk decrease. Thus, the quality of the information
provided increases - to the benefit of all the users of the Internet. This collective
aspect implies that, in general, a decentralised equilibrium is inefficient. The paper
5shows that the social-planner solution can be implemented by means of a simple
regulation of filter tolerance.
The paper is organised as follows. The next section presents the model. Section 3
analyses consumer and producer behaviour. Section 4 presents the equilibrium anal-
ysis and discusses welfare. Section 5 deals with optimal policy. Section 6 summarises
the results. Proofs are provided in the Appendix.
2 Model
The economy consists of two types of agents: monopolistic firms and price-taking
consumers. The firms decide on market entry and product price. The consumers
set a filter parameter and decide how much to buy of a perceived product variant.
Individual agents have zero mass and take aggregate values as given.
Let Ω be an exogenous set of potential variants of goods. Out of this set, firms create
product innovations and advertise them to consumers. Let T of measure T denote
the set of firms. Each firm t ∈ T draws one variant ω(t) ∈ Ω, where ω(t) 6= ω(t′) for
t 6= t′. Denote ΩT ≡ {ω(t) |t ∈ T} . The measure of ΩT, equal to T , describes the
aggregate diversity of supply (of information and goods). The equilibrium value of
T is determined by free entry. For entering, a firm has to incur a fixed cost f , which
is exogenous to the individual firm but endogenously determined in the competition
for attention.
Let N = [0, 1] be the set of consumers. Each consumer is endowed with budget
y and information-processing capacity τ0. This means that a consumer is able to
perceive information about a mass of τ0 products. For instance, τ0 units of time are
6available; studying material about the characteristics of a set of products of mass 1
requires 1/τ0 units of time.
3 Budget y and information-processing capacity τ0 are
exogenous.
Consumer i ∈ N is exposed to information about set Si ⊂ ΩT of items.4 This
information supply may be more than the consumer is actually able to perceive.
Let Mi ⊂ Si be the set of products (s)he actually perceives. Denote by Si and
Mi the measures of Si and Mi, respectively. Whereas Si describes the diversity of
supply, Mi is the perceived diversity. Si and Mi are endogenously determined. They
depend on the way in which producers distribute information and consumers filter
this information.
2.1 Consumer preferences
Consumers have a preference for variety. So, in principle, they like to have access
to advertising about a large set of items.5 Nonetheless, they may like some items
more than others. I capture these preferences by means of the following CES utility
3For a more general discussion as to why human behaviour is subject to a limited capacity for
perception, see the literature on attention psychology, for instance, Kahneman [1973] or the survey
by Pashler [1998]. For a theoretical foundation of competitive equilibrium analysis under scarcity
of attention, see Falkinger [2007].
4⊂ denotes weak inclusion.
5Attitudes of the kind “leave me alone” are not considered. The problem of preferring a quiet
life has a trivial solution as far as information exposure is concerned: Simply disconnect your
computer and communication device. The issue of being exposed to a flood of more or less useful
information only arises because we actually want an abundant variety of information.
7function for consumer i:
U i =
∫
Mi
δi(ω)xi(ω)
ρdω
1/ρ , 0 < ρ < 1, (1)
where xi(ω) denotes the quantity consumed of variant ω, and δi(ω) ∈ [0, 1] is a
weight reflecting i’s valuation of the different product variants.6 To model junk, I
assume that for each consumer i there is a set Ii ⊂ Ω of potential goods that are
“ideal” for i, whereas ω /∈ Ii is less valuable or useless. Formally,
δi(ω) =
 1 if ω ∈ Ii,δ otherwise, (2)
with δ ∈ [0, 1]. The assumption that the weight function δi(ω) assumes only two
values substantially simplifies the analysis. Advertisements that provide informa-
tion about elements of Ii are welcome to the consumer. Other advertisements are
considered - in a loose sense - to be junk. (In a strict sense, ω /∈ Ii is junk infor-
mation if δ = 0.) Moreover, δ ≥ 0 excludes harassment. Junk as modelled here
has no direct negative effect on utility. It is only harmful to the extent that more
useful information might be crowded out. Different consumers can have different
ideal sets Ii. However, the sets may overlap; that is, several consumers may share
their valuation of advertised items. For tractability reasons, the following symmetry
assumption is imposed on consumer heterogeneity.
Assumption 1. Let I ≡ ⋃
i∈N
Ii. There exists h ∈ (0, 1] so that for all i ∈ N :
prob{ω ∈ Ii|ω ∈ I} = h.
6This weights allow for asymmetries between goods in the Dixit and Stiglitz [1977] model of
monopolistic competition while keeping the elasticity of substitution constant.
8The assumption restricts the heterogeneity of tastes. The conditional probability
that an item is ideal for a particular consumer, assuming that the item is ideal for
anybody at all, is the same for all consumers. That is, each Ii has an equal share in I.
Denote by Ii and I the measures of Ii and I, respectively. According to Assumption
1,
Ii = hI. (3)
Thus, parameter h describes the homogeneity (1/h the heterogeneity) of tastes in
the population.
2.2 Innovation and distribution of information
A firm t ∈ T that wants to enter the market makes a random draw ω(t) ∈ Ω.
The drawn variant may match consumer tastes to a greater or lesser extent. The
following assumption is imposed on the innovation process.
Assumption 2. There exists χ ∈ (0, 1] so that for all t ∈ T : prob {ω(t) ∈ I} = χ.
The assumption states that the probability of an innovation being ideal for some
consumers is given by an exogenous success rate (χ). Together with Assumption 1,
this implies that the probability that an innovation is ideal for consumer i is hχ.
Whether or not a particular variant is liked by some consumers is revealed only after
it has been advertised. This requires fixed costs f ≥ f0, where f0 is exogenous. The
variable unit costs of production are given by a constant c. The fixed costs depend on
the intensity of competition for attention. If there is no such competition – because
consumers have free capacity to process any piece of information they are exposed
9to (that is, if Si < τ0) – then the cost of advertising a variant equals f0. However, if
information exposure exceeds the consumers’ information-processing capacity, then
the required intensity of advertising increases. For instance, if consumers skip every
second piece of information, a firm has to approach each of them at least twice
in order to obtain their attention. The determination of f through competition
for attention will be described more precisely in Section 3.2, which analyses the
profitability of entry.
The set of consumers to whom information about a variety is distributed depends
on the available IT possibilities and media. Moreover, this set may be influenced by
attempts to target advertisements so as to match consumer tastes. For ω ∈ ΩT, let
ϕ(ω, i) denote the probability that a firm’s information about ω will reach consumer
i. Then the number of items advertised to a consumer will be
Si =
∫
ΩT
ϕ(ω, i)dω. (4)
This describes the diversity of the information exposure of i. In order to separate
the technical possibilities for distributing information from information-targeting
measures or general junk control, I make the following simplifying assumption about
information distribution.
Assumption 3. There exists ϕ0 ∈ (0, 1] , ϕ1 ∈ [0, 1] and ϕ2 ∈ [0, 1] so that for all i:
ϕ(ω, i) =

ϕ0 if ω ∈ Ii,
ϕ1ϕ0 if ω ∈ I− Ii,
ϕ2ϕ0 otherwise.
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This assumption allows for differentiated distribution of information. For instance,
ϕ2 < 1 means that items that nobody considers as ideal (“general junk”) are dis-
tributed less widely than ideals. For instance, the use of collective blacklists by
providers of Internet services reduces the distribution of general junk. If, in addi-
tion, ϕ1 < 1, then a consumer is predominantly exposed to targeted information
about his/her ideals. Parameter ϕ0 characterises the technical possibilities for dis-
tributing information. ϕ0 = 1 means that the information techniques available to a
firm allow the firm’s advertisement to be distributed to all consumers. The following
lemma characterises the diversity and quality of information exposure of consumers
resulting under Assumptions 2 and 3. Moreover, for each variant ω, the lemma
determines the expected range R(ω), defined as the mass of consumers a firm can
expect to reach by advertising ω.
Lemma 1. (a) For all ω, i: R(ω) = ϕ0ϕ˜(h, χ) and Si = ϕ0ϕ˜(h, χ)T , where ϕ˜(h, χ) ≡
hχ+ϕ1(1−h)χ+ϕ2(1−χ). (b) Let qSi denote the share of items in Si that belongs
to Ii. For all i, q
S
i =
hχ
ϕ˜(h,χ)
.
The lemma shows how homogeneity of tastes (h), success rate of innovations (χ),
technical possibilities for information distribution (ϕ0), and central filters and tar-
geting measures (ϕ1, ϕ2) determine the expected firm range (R), the diversity of
advertisements to which a consumer is exposed (S) and the quality of information
received by a consumer, defined as the share of advertisements about useful products
in total advertisement exposure (qS).7 The following examples illustrate the role of
7Since R(ω) is the same for all ω and Si, qSi are identical for all i, the arguments of R,S, q
S are
dropped in the further analysis.
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the various determinants.
Example 1. (Random distribution of information). For ϕ1 = ϕ2 = 1, we have
ϕ˜(h, χ) = 1, so that R = ϕ0, S = ϕ0T and q
S = hχ.
This example includes the case of global information distribution with ϕ0 = 1. In
this case, the firm range equals population size, and the size of the information
exposure of consumers is equal to the number of firms. The quality of the received
information is a product of the quality of innovations and the homogeneity of tastes.
This explains why we are exposed to a mix of valuable information and junk when
we use the Internet. The reason is that under global information technology, any
piece of information reaches all of us, and what is useful for me may be useless for
you. Moreover, producers are not sure what pleases consumers. The next example
assumes that firms are able to distribute only useful information or that providers
can suppress general junk.
Example 2. (Suppression of general junk). For ϕ1 = 1, ϕ2 = 0, we have ϕ˜(h, χ) =
χ, so that R = ϕ0χ, S = ϕ0χT and q
S = h.
If only those items are advertised that are ideal at least for some of the consumers,
then the size of information exposure decreases and the quality of received informa-
tion increases. However, this quality still remains limited by h, the homogeneity of
tastes. Only perfect targeting would eliminate the role of h. If both ϕ1 and ϕ2 were
zero, then we would get qS = 1. so that the problem of junk information would
vanish. The following assumption excludes this possibility.
Assumption 4. qS < 1.
12
This assumption also excludes the case of complete homogeneity of tastes (h = 1)
combined with a flawless process of innovation (χ = 1). According to Lemma 1,
this would imply qS = 1 and render filters meaningless. Assumption 4 reflects the
fact that Ii is an individual preference characteristic and thus private knowledge
belonging to the consumer. Neither firms nor a central information agency can
perfectly match i’s ideal varieties.
2.3 Spam filter and perception of information
To repeat, a consumer is exposed to information about the set Si of products ad-
vertised to him/her. (S)he focuses attention on Mi ⊂ Si. The focus of attention is
determined by the consumer’s information-processing capacity and the filter used.
The capacity constraint limits the size of the perceived set of items to
Mi ≤ τ0. (5)
If information exposure S is less than or equal to τ0, each piece of information
advertised to the consumer will be perceived by the consumer. By contrast, if S > τ0,
then there is scarcity of attention and some fraction of advertisements will have to be
skipped. By using a personalised filter – with individual whitelists and blacklists – a
consumer can influence the quality of the information requesting his/her attention.
However, perfect filtering is unavailable. Typically, there are two types of errors:
First, a valuable item may be rejected; second, junk may pass the filter. This can be
modelled as follows. Based on the profile provided by the consumer, a filter assigns
to each ω ∈ Si a probability ai(ω) that ω /∈ Ii (“junk probability”). 1 − ai(ω) is
the probability that ω ∈ Ii. The consumer can choose the tightness of the filter by
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fixing the maximal junk probability (s)he tolerates. Under tolerance level A, the set
of items passing the filter is then given by FiA ≡ {ω ∈ Si|ai(ω) ≤ A}. Let
ψ1(A) ≡ prob {ω ∈ FiA|ω ∈ Ii}
ψ2(A) ≡ prob {ω ∈ FiA|ω /∈ Ii}
be the probability that the filter does not reject ideals and the probability that junk
passes the filter, respectively. Then,
z(A) ≡ ψ1(A)
ψ2(A)
is a measure for the precision of the filter.
A consumer may be more or less careful in personalising the filter. This clearly
affects filter precision z. However, given the personal profile, it is tolerance A that
determines precision. For instance, for A = 0, only items from the “whitelist”,
which are definitely considered valuable by the consumer, will pass the filter. If A
increases, then any item has a higher chance of passing the filter, and in particular
junk information will also be more likely to pass. This is captured by the following
assumption.
Assumption 5. (a) For A < 1,
dψj
dA
> 0, j = 1, 2. (b) z(A) = 1 (random filter) or:
z(A) > 1 and dz
dA
< 0 for A < 1.
Obviously z(A) ≥ 1 for any reasonable filter. This excludes the likelihood of a filter
predominantly picking junk. The last part of the assumption reflects the trade-
off between tolerance and precision. A higher filter tolerance reduces the risk that
valuable information will be rejected by increasing ψ1. However, it increases the
probability that junk will pass through even more, so that filter precision declines.
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The following lemma describes the relationship between information exposure and
perception if the consumer employs a filter of tolerance level A.
Lemma 2. Let i be exposed to Si of size S and quality q
S, as given by Lemma 1. Let
Mi be selected by a filter of tolerance level Ai and denote by qi the share of ideals in
Mi. Then we have: (a)
Mi
S
= ψ1(Ai)q
S +ψ2(Ai)(1− qS) ≡ ψ(Ai) and qi = ψ1(Ai)ψ(Ai) qS.
(b) For A < 1, dψ/dA > 0 and dqi/dA < 0 if z(A) > 1.
The lemma shows that loosening the filter increases perceived diversity Mi at the
cost of the quality of perceived information qi. Finally, capacity constraint (5)
requires
ψ(Ai)S ≤ τ0, (6)
which places a limit on filter tolerance.
3 Consumer and producer behaviour
Individual agents take aggregate values as given. A consumer decides about two
things: the filter setting and, for each perceived product, the quantity purchased.
A firm decides about market entry and about the price to charge for its product.
3.1 Consumers
Given Mi and goods prices p(ω), the consumer chooses for ω ∈Mi quantities xi(ω)
so as to maximise (1) subject to the budget constraint∫
Mi
p(ω)xi(ω)dω ≤ y. (7)
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This gives for i’s demand functions
xi(ω) = δi(ω)
ε y
Pi
p(ω)−ε, (8)
with ε ≡ 1
1−ρ > 1 and Pi ≡
∫
Mi
δi(ω)
εp(ω)1−εdω. (The derivation of (8) is provided
in the Appendix.)
The firms, facing iso-elastic demand, set p(ω) = 1
1−1/ε = c/ρ ≡ p (see Section 3.2
for the market demand implied by (8)). Thus, (8) reduces to
xi(ω) =
y
pMi
δi(ω)
ε
Di
, (9)
where Di ≡ 1Mi
∫
Mi
δi(ω)
εdω is the average quality of the items perceived and con-
sumed by i. In view of (2), we have
Di = qi + δ
ε(1− qi), (10)
where qi is the share of ideals in Mi given by Lemma 2.
Substituting (9) into (1), we obtain8 for the utility of consumer i:
V i =
y
p
(MiDi)
1−ρ
ρ . (11)
According to Lemma 2, both the diversity Mi and the quality qi of perceived items
depend on the filter tolerance chosen by the consumer. A looser filter increases
diversity at the cost of lower quality. The following proposition characterises the
individually optimal filter tolerance.
Proposition 1. Given information exposure S of quality qS, every consumer chooses
Ai = A(S), where A(S) is defined by the condition ψ(A(S)) = min {τ0/S, 1}.
8Note that 1 + ρε = ε.
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The proposition shows that for the individual it is optimal to choose filter tolerance
so as to perceive as many as possible of the advertisements to which he or she is
exposed. For Ai = A(S), Mi = S if S < τ0 and Mi = τ0 otherwise. A tighter filter
would increase the quality of information passing the filter – at the risk of losing
information, however. According to Lemma 2, for Mi = τ0, A(S) decreases with
S. Growing information exposure allows the consumer to be more choosy. As a
consequence, the quality of perceived information qi rises. (Note that qi is inversely
related to A, according to Lemma 2.) In sum, consumers profit from a richer supply
of information. However, the supply of information by firms depends on aggregate
consumer behaviour and cannot be influenced by the individual consumer.
3.2 Firms
According to Assumption 3, a firm advertising ω reaches consumers for which ω is
ideal with probability ϕ0. The probability that the advertisement passes the spam
filter of a consumer i is ψ1(A). Moreover, according to Assumptions 1 and 2, the
probability that ω is ideal for the consumer is hχ. In this case δi = 1 in i’s demand
function (8). With probability ϕ0ϕ1(1 − h)χ + ϕ0ϕ2(1 − χ), the advertisement is
sent to a consumer for whom it is spam, and the probability that it passes the spam
filter is ψ2(A). In this case, δi = δ in (8). In sum, the expected market demand for
ω is given by
X(ω) = p(ω)−εyϕ0
∫
N
[
ψ1(A)hχ
Pi
+
δεψ2(A)
Pi
(ϕ1χ(1− h) + ϕ2(1− χ))
]
di, (12)
which is iso-elastic. Thus, for all ω, the monopoly price is given by p = c/ρ.
Substituting this in (12) and calculating expected operating profit, we get the fol-
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lowing result:
Proposition 2. Suppose firm t expects that consumers spend their budget on M
products and use a filter of strength A, then expected demand for product ω(t) is
X = yr
pM
and expected operating profit is pi = (1−ρ)y
M
r, with r ≡ ψ(A)R, where ψ(A)
(with dψ/dA > 0) and R are given by Lemma 2 and Lemma 1, respectively.
A firm advertising good ω to consumer i knows that the advertisement passes i’s
filter with probability ψ1(A) if ω matches i’s ideals and with probability ψ2(A) if it
does not. Consumers whose filter rejects the advertisement ignore ω. The rejection
rate increases if filter tolerance A is reduced. Therefore, the relevant firm range r
and expected profits decline if tighter filters are used.
The expected operating profit pi defines the willingness to pay for market entry. The
possibilities of entry depend on whether consumer attention is scarce or not. The
following assumption defines the required entry costs.
Assumption 6. In an economy with a set of firms T and information exposure S:
(i) If S < τ0, a firm t
′ /∈ T can enter by spending f0. (ii) If S ≥ τ0, then t′ /∈ T can
enter by spending more on advertising than t ∈ T.
Part (i) of the assumption deals with the case where there is no scarcity of consumer
attention. In this case, some exogenous fixed cost – given by the feasible innovation
and distribution technology – is necessary and sufficient to reach consumers. This
reflects the traditional view of informative advertising. In contrast, if consumer
attention is scarce, then a firm must edge other firms out of the consumer’s mind
by multiplying advertisements. This is captured by Part (ii). Under free entry, pi
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must equal the cost of entry. This leads to equalised entry cost f under scarcity of
attention, too. Assumption 6 implies that f > f0 only if S ≥ τ0.
4 Equilibrium and welfare
An economy is in equilibrium if consumers and firms behave as described in the
previous section, if the firms’ expectations are correct, if the zero-profit condition
holds and if the aggregate resource constraints are satisfied.
According to Proposition 1, consumer behaviour is in equilibrium if filter tolerance
A and information exposure S satisfy the relationship
ψ(A) = min {τ0/S, 1} . (13)
Moreover, according to Lemma 2, diversity of perception M is related to information
exposure by
M = ψ(A)S. (14)
According to Proposition 2, under correct expectations each firm expects profit
pi = (1−ρ)y
M
ψ(A)R. Thus, the zero-profit condition reads
(1− ρ)y
M
ψ(A)R = f. (15)
Finally, the aggregate income constraint requires that total consumption expendi-
ture pXT equals total income y.9 Using X = y
pM
ψ(A)R from Proposition 2, this
condition reduces to
ψ(A)RT = M. (16)
9The other aggregate constraint is that the diversity of distributed information RT must equal
the diversity of information exposure S. However, this already follows from (14) and (16).
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In addition to these equilibrium conditions, we must also keep in mind the feasibility
constraints
M ≤ τ0, f ≥ f0. (17)
The system of equations (13) to (17) characterises equilibrium values for the vari-
ables A (or ψ(A)), S,M, f and T . It is worth noting that if these five variables are
determined, then all other consumer variables of the model – qi, Di, xi(ω) – are de-
termined as well, namely by Lemma 2, Equation (10) and Equation (9), respectively.
When considering equilibria we must distinguish between a situation in which firms
are competing for scarce consumer attention and the conventional case of informa-
tive advertising (with no crowding). This is captured by the following definition,
suggested by Falkinger [2008]:
Definition 1. An equilibrium is information poor if S ≤ τ0 and f = f0. Otherwise
the equilibrium is information rich.
Lemma 3. In an information-rich equilibrium, S ≥ τ0.
We will see that an economy has either an information-poor or an information-
rich equilibrium. Therefore, it makes sense to call an economy information poor or
information rich.
4.1 Information-poor economies
The following proposition characterises economies in which decentralised competi-
tion leads to an information-poor equilibrium. Since firm profits are zero in equilib-
rium, only consumer utility matters for welfare.
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Proposition 3. If (1 − ρ)yR/f0 ≤ τ0, then: (i) The economy has a unique equi-
librium. The equilibrium is information poor. (ii) In the equilibrium ψ(A) = 1,
M = S = (1 − ρ)yR/f0. Consumer utility is given by V P = U0(RD0)
1−ρ
ρ , where
U0 ≡ y1/ρ(1−ρf0 )
1−ρ
ρ /p and D0 ≡ hχϕ˜(h,χ)(1− δε) + δε.
Recalling R = ϕ0ϕ˜(h, χ) from Lemma 1, we learn from the first part of the proposi-
tion that a small feasible range (ϕ0) of information distribution or high costs f0 are
one reason why there is no problem of scarce attention in an economy. Another rea-
son might be information targeting or homogenous consumer tastes – both reduce
ϕ˜, which means a consumer is exposed to less information of little or no use. Welfare
increases with the range of information distribution. This confirms the conventional
view of informative advertising. In an information-poor economy, zero-profit condi-
tion (15) reduces to M = (1− ρ)yR/f0. Perceived diversity is equal to the diversity
of supply (M = S) and limited by the innovation and information possibilities of
firms. If firms can inform a wider range of consumers, people can choose from a
more diverse set of goods. However, whereas an increase in the technically feasible
range (ϕ0) is unambiguously positive, an increase in ϕ˜ has a negative side effect. Ac-
cording to Part (b) of Lemma 1, a rise in ϕ˜ means that the distributed information
matches consumer tastes less precisely. Thus, the increased diversity comes with a
lower average quality (D0), which reduces utility. For the net effect, we calculate,
by use of Lemma 1, the expression
RD0 = ϕ0 {hχ+ δε [ϕ1(1− h)χ+ ϕ2(1− χ)]} . (18)
Obviously, a higher success rate of innovations (χ) is beneficial. So is homogeneity
of tastes (h). Both make a good match between innovations and preferences more
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likely. They are – together with the technical range (ϕ0) – the basic determinants
of utility if non-ideals are pure junk. For δ = 0, we have RD0 = ϕ0hχ. If δ > 0,
then also general junk suppression (ϕ2 < 1) or information targeting ϕ1 < 1 matter.
As expression (18) shows, such measures are not desirable in an information-poor
economy. It is true that they increase the quality of received information, but they
do this at the cost of diversity. And as long as junk may convey some information,
the latter effect dominates. The reason is that in an information-poor economy,
junk has no opportunity costs in terms of crowding out more useful information.
This changes, of course, if the economy is information rich. And, as we will see,
less careful distribution of information – raising ϕ˜ and thus R – could be one of the
reasons why an economy becomes information rich. Hence, the considerations about
the role of careless distribution of information in an information-poor economy come
with a caveat. Only if the economy is information poor for ϕ1 = ϕ2 = 1, that is, if
(1− ρ)yϕ0/f0 ≤ τ0, do they apply without any reservations.
4.2 Information-rich economies
According to Lemma 3, S ≥ τ0 if an equilibrium is information rich. Thus, the
equilibrium condition (13) takes the form
ψ(A) = τ0/S, (19)
and (14) gives M = τ0. Moreover, with M = τ0, condition (15) reads
(1− ρ)y
τ0
ψ(A)R = f. (20)
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The next proposition characterises economies in which competition leads to information-
rich equilibria.
Proposition 4. If (1 − ρ)yR/f0 > τ0, then: (i) All equilibria of the economy are
information rich. (ii) Any tuple A, S, f satisfying (19), (20) and f ≥ f0 is an equi-
librium. (iii) Consumer utility depends on the filter tightness adopted in equilibrium.
It is given by V R = y
p
(τ0D)
1−ρ
ρ , where D = ψ1(A)
ψ(A)
hχ
ϕ˜(h,χ)
(1− δε) + δε.
The proposition shows that an information-rich economy differs with respect to a
series of important elements from the information-poor one. First, in contrast to an
information-poor economy, IT progress (an increase in ϕ0 or a decrease in f0) plays
no direct role for welfare in an information-rich equilibrium, as shown by Part (iii)
of the proposition. The reason can be seen by looking at Equilibrium Condition
(20). For given filter tolerance A, any increase in the range of information distribu-
tion raises advertising expenditure because firms then have a stronger incentive to
compete for consumer attention. However, Condition (20) also implies that if R is
high, then the constraint f ≥ f0 holds for lower values of ψ(A). That means that
an increase in R allows equilibria with tighter filters. I will come back to this point
when discussing policy in Section 5. Second, for given filter tolerance, more careful
distribution of information (reducing ϕ˜) is unambiguously beneficial for consumers
in an information- rich economy. Under random distribution of information (Ex-
ample 1 in Section 2), and in particular under global distribution of advertisements
to all consumers, we have ϕ˜(h, χ) = 1 and thus D = ψ1(A)
ψ(A)
hχ(1 − δε) + δε ≡ D1.
Comparing this with the case of general junk suppression (Example 2) – for in-
stance, if providers eliminate advertisements considered generally as junk, we have
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ϕ˜(h, χ) = χ < 1 and D = ψ1(A)
ψ(A)
h(1− δε) + δε > D1.
Third, the most important implication of Proposition 4 is that an information-rich
economy has multiple equilibria. Higher filter tolerance is harmful in an information-
rich economy because it reduces the quality of information exposure.10 The problem
is that the individual consumer has no influence on the filter tolerance realised in
equilibrium. According to Proposition 1, the consumer adjusts his/her filter toler-
ance so as to bring the information exposure in line with the information-processing
capacity. Deviating from this filter choice to a tighter one would mean unused ca-
pacity and a loss of potential information. By choosing Ai so that ψ(Ai) = τ0/S,
the consumer exploits the received information optimally. But there is no way to
influence the information supplied. For this to happen, the expectations of firms
would have to be changed, and these obviously do not depend on the behaviour
of a single consumer. The following illustration summarises the basic mechanisms
involved. Suppose that firms expect lax filtering. Then, according to Proposition 2,
the expected range of consumers they can effectively reach increases so that market
entry becomes more attractive. This leads to a rise in advertising expenditure so
as to bring the cost of entry in line with the willingness to pay for entry according
to (20). At the same time, firm size increases, so as to cover the higher entry cost,
and the number of firms declines.11 Thus, every consumer is exposed to less diverse
information (S = RT , according to Lemma 1). The best choice remaining for the
10Note that ψ1(A)ψ(A) =
1
qS+(1−qS)ψ2(A)/ψ1(A) and that z(A) = ψ1(A)/ψ2(A) decreases with A
(Assumption 5). Thus, ψ1(A)/ψ(A) and D decline with A. (Recall that qS < 1 under Assumption
4.)
11According to (16), for M = τ0, T = τ0ψ(A)R . dψ/dA > 0 implies dT/dA < 0.
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individual consumer is also to loosen filtering in order to get the maximum out of
the reduced information supply. This illustrates a possible vicious circle. Obvi-
ously, the circle also works the other way round. In any case, it shows that in an
information-rich economy, a decentralised equilibrium will not be efficient except by
coincidence.
5 Policy
The equilibrium analysis has shown that in an information-rich economy there are
multiple equilibria. Moreover, the various equilibria lead to different welfare levels.
This points to an important role for policy intervention. According to Proposition
4, V R = y
p
(τ0D)
1−ρ
ρ , where D is a decreasing function of equilibrium filter tolerance
A. As shown by Equilibrium Condition (20), high filter tolerance goes hand in hand
with high advertisement expenditure by firms. On the other hand, a high cost of ad-
vertising requires large firms. Thus, the diversity of goods advertised to consumers
is comparatively smaller than under conditions of lower advertising costs. In other
words, loose filtering goes hand in hand with wasteful advertising, which reduces the
diversity of supply. This has a direct and an indirect effect on the average quality
of goods both perceived and consumed. The direct effect comes from the fact that
the set of ideals advertised to a consumer shrinks. The size of this set is given by
Ii = q
SS, where qS = hχ/ϕ˜(h, χ) depends on the heterogeneity of tastes (among
other things). If S declines, Ii is also reduced. However, there is a further, indi-
rect effect on the average quality of perceived goods. Under scarcity of attention, a
consumer does not see the full set of advertisements, rather only the subset passing
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his/her filter. Now, if the diversity of supply declines due to wasteful advertising
expenditure, the consumer will relax his/her filter tightness. This means that more
of everything, and in particular also more junk, will pass through.
The fact that lax filtering by the mass of consumers triggers a vicious circle of
wasteful advertising by firms and adoption of a lax filter by each individual con-
sumer suggests that regulating filter tolerance might be a remedy. The following
proposition describes the optimal regulation.
Proposition 5. Suppose that the economy is information rich. Let Amin be defined
by the equation ψ(Amin) =
τ0f0
(1−ρ)yR . An equilibrium with maximal consumer welfare
results if Ai ≤ Amin is imposed on consumers. In the resulting equilibrium, f = f0.
According to Proposition 1, a consumer facing signal exposure S ≥ τ0 has an interest
in raising filter tolerance Ai up to the level where Mi = ψ(Ai)S = τ0. Now, under
Amin the effective range (r = ψ(A)R) of a firm is
τ0f0
(1−ρ)y , so that, according to
(16), T = (1 − ρ)y/f0 firms find it profitable to enter the market. This gives for
information exposure S = RT = R(1−ρ)y/f0. Thus, optimal individual filter choice
is indeed Ai = Amin.
According to Proposition 4, average perceived quality D – and thus utility – is a
decreasing function of equilibrium filter tolerance. This is why it is desirable to
implement an equilibrium with tight filtering. The limit comes from the constraint
f ≥ f0. (Firms must be able to cover the innovation and information costs.) If
Ai = Amin, then f = f0. Wasteful advertising is avoided and consumer welfare is
maximal.
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Moreover, under Amin, equilibrium quality qi is given by
q∗ ≡ ψ1(Amin)
ψ(Amin)
qS, qS =
hχ
ϕ˜(h, χ)
. (21)
According to Lemma 2, ψ1(Amin)/ψ(Amin) decreases with Amin, where Amin is in turn
a decreasing function of R = ϕ0ϕ˜(h, χ). Thus, under optimal filter regulation, an
extension of the technically feasible range of information distribution is positive for
product quality and utility. Information targeting (lowering ϕ1) or central filtering
of general junk (lowering ϕ2) decreases ϕ˜. This has a direct positive effect on q
∗ but
an indirect negative effect by increasing Amin. For given parameter values h and χ,
the total effect can be easily seen by substituting ψ(Amin) =
τ0f0
(1−ρ)yR into (21) and
using R = ϕ0ϕ˜(h, χ). We get q
∗ = ψ1(Amin)
(1−ρ)yϕ0hχ
τ0f0
). Thus, reducing ϕ˜ is good
for quality. It allows looser individual filtering, which increases ψ1(Amin), that is,
the probability of not missing a useful piece of information.
For given ϕ1 and ϕ2, range ϕ˜ and thus Amin depend on homogeneity h and the
success rate of innovations χ. It is straightforward to check: (i) ∂qS/∂h > 0 and
(ii) ∂ϕ˜/∂χ ≥ 0 (with equality for ϕ2 = 0). Moreover, ∂ϕ˜/∂h ≥ 0 (with equality for
ϕ1 = ϕ2 = 1). Thus, both the direct and the indirect effect on q
∗ of homogeneity and
innovation success rate are non-negative and the total effect is positive. However,
while wasteful advertising can be eliminated by optimal filter regulation, and while
the targeting of information distribution may be improved by firms, the innovation
process is probably less easy to control. Definitely out of the range of any policy
control is the heterogeneity of preferences. This heterogeneity is the ultimate reason
why each of us will be exposed to junk information even under the best policies and
under conditions of optimal individual behaviour.
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Finally, it is worth noting that for optimal filter regulation, the regulator does not
need to know individual preferences, that is, who has which ideals. Amin depends
only on the parameters responsible for information richness, in particular on the
ratio of fixed costs over market size. ((1 − ρ) can be inferred from the price-cost
margin.) The regulation proposed in Proposition 5 recommends to consumers a
minimal rejection rate, not a specific content to be rejected. The personalisation
with respect to the content of the items that should be accepted or rejected is left to
the individual. This personalisation defines the assignment of junk probabilities and
thus the functions ψ1(A) and ψ2(A). As long as these functions have the properties
described, in particular the fact that perfect filtering is excluded because the exact
content of information is revealed only after perception, the role of filter tolerance
remains.
6 Conclusion
Progress in information technologies provides producers with the opportunity to
distribute information about their product to a wide range of consumers. Not all
information is equally useful, however. In particular, if there is heterogeneity, what
is valuable for one individual may be considered useless by another. The larger the
range of consumers who can be addressed by a producer, the more consumers will
be exposed to the same set of advertisements. Under heterogeneous preferences,
this implies that consumers receive, along with useful advertisements, additional
information which is useless to them. As long as consumers have free capacity to
perceive each supplied piece of information, exposure to more advertisements is wel-
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come, even if the mix of useful and useless items is poor. In contrast, if attention
is scarce, junk information has opportunity costs, and measures to improve the mix
of perceived information are definitely beneficial for consumers. Better targeting of
information distribution is clearly one instrument that can be used to improve the
match between advertisements and preferences. However, the asymmetric nature of
the relationship between producers and users of information puts crucial limits on
the possibilities for targeting information. While the producer knows the content of
the information sent, the user has the knowledge about how to value this content
according to his/her preferences. The definite value can only be assessed by pro-
cessing the information.
By employing a personalised filter, the user can save information-processing capac-
ity. However, perfect filtering is unfeasible. On the one hand, under a very tolerant
filter much junk will pass through in addition to the useful information. On the
other hand, a tighter filter may block useful information along with the junk.
This paper analysed the equilibrium effects of individual filters in an economy with
limited information-processing capacity. The basic characteristic of a filter is its
tolerance. The consumer can control the quality of perceived items by employing a
filter which is more or less in line with his/her preference profile and by setting a
threshold for the tolerated junk probability. However, an individual consumer has
no control over the quality of information supplied in the first place. Since produc-
ers address a mass of consumers, this quality is a function of aggregate behaviour.
It was shown that the aggregate diversity of distributed information, which is the
basis on which a filter can sample, depends on the expected filter tolerance used
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in the population. The individual consumer has no influence on this. (S)he simply
adjusts individual filter tolerance so as to bring information exposure in line with
her/his information-processing capacity. This gives rise to multiple equilibria in the
information-rich economy. If everybody applies a low rejection rate, firms will en-
gage in fierce competition for attention. This will lead to wasteful advertising and
drive product variants out of the market. In contrast, if everybody chooses a high
rejection rate, the crowding between single firms’ advertisements will be reduced.
This will increase the diversity of aggregate supply.
The aggregate effects imply that in general the market equilibrium of an information-
rich economy is inefficient. It was shown that a social optimum can be implemented
by regulating filter tolerance: Each consumer has to use a filter that rejects at least
the prescribed rate of received advertisements. This rate depends on the feasible
range of information distribution and the heterogeneity of consumers, but involves
no knowledge of individual preferences. The personalisation of the profile on which
the rejection or acceptance of items is based is left to the consumer, provided that
the required filter tightness is achieved.
A final caveat is in order. The analysis was based on the assumption that all ad-
vertising is informative in the sense that knowledge about the identity of a product
is transmitted. This knowledge may be junk insofar as the product is useless to a
consumer or even to all consumers. Moreover, it was assumed that all firms have
zero mass. Obviously, persuasive advertising or strategic use of information would
make a big difference.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. (a)R(ω) = ϕ0prob {ω ∈ Ii}+ ϕ0ϕ1prob {ω ∈ I− Ii}+ ϕ0ϕ2prob {ω /∈ I} .
According to Assumptions 1 and 2, prob{ω ∈ Ii} = hχ, prob{ω ∈ I− Ii} = (1−h)χ
and prob {ω /∈ I} = 1− χ. In an analogous way, we get Si.
(b) The measure of ideals in Si is given by
∫
ΩT∩Ii
ϕ(ω, i)dω = ϕ0hχT . Dividing this
by Si = ϕ0ϕ˜(h, χ)T , we have q
S. QED.
Proof of Lemma 2. (a) Mi =
∫
Si∩Ii
ψ1dω +
∫
Si−Ii
ψ2dω = ψ1q
SS + ψ2(1 − qS)S. (b)
dψ/dA > 0 follows immediately from dψj/dA > 0. dqi/dA < 0 is equivalent to
dz/dA < 0. QED.
Derivation of (8). The Lagrangian for max
xi(ω)
U i subject to (7) is
L =
[ ∫
Mi
δi(ω)xi(ω)
ρdω
]1/ρ
+λ
[
y − ∫
Mi
p(ω)xi(ω)dω
]
. Solving the first-order condition for
xi(ω) gives us xi(ω) = δi(ω)
εp(ω)−ελ−εU i, ε ≡ 1
1−ρ . Using this in the budget con-
straint
∫
Mi
p(ω)xi(ω)dω = y, we obtain λ
−εU i = y/Pi. Hence, xi(ω) = δi(ω)εp(ω)−εy/Pi.
QED.
Proof of Proposition 1. Substituting (10) into (11) and using Part (a) of Lemma 2,
we get V i = y
p
[
S
[
ψ1(Ai)q
D(1− δε) + ψ(Ai)δε
]] 1−ρ
ρ , which increases in Ai because
of Assumptions 4 and 5. Thus, i chooses the maximal A consistent with (6). QED.
Proof of Proposition 2. With Ai = A in Lemma 2 and (10), we have qi =
ψ1(A)
ψ(A)
qS ≡
q(A) and Di = q(A) + δ
ε(1 − q(A)) ≡ D(A). Applying the definition of ψ, we
get 1 − q(A) = ψ2(A)(1−qS)
ψ(A)
, where qS = hχ
ϕ˜(h,χ)
and 1 − qS = ϕ1(1−h)χ+ϕ2(1−χ)
ϕ˜(h,χ)
,
according to Lemma 1 and the definition of ϕ˜(h, χ). Moreover, for Mi = M
and p(ω) = p, we have Pi = p
1−εMD(A). Using these facts in (12), we obtain
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X(ω) = yϕ0
pMD(A)
[q(A)ψ(A)ϕ˜(h, χ) + δε[1 − q(A)]ϕ˜(h, χ)ψ(A)] = yϕ0ψ(A)ϕ˜(h,χ)
pM
, which
reduces to yψ(A)R
pM
since R = ϕ0ϕ˜(h, χ), according to Lemma 1. Finally, p = c/ρ
gives us (p− c)X = (1− ρ)yr/M . QED.
Proof of Lemma 3. Non-IP is equivalent to S > τ0 or f > f0. According to As-
sumption 6, f > f0 implies S ≥ τ0. This and f ≥ f0 imply that if an equilibrium
is information rich, then S ≥ τ0 and f ≥ f0, with one inequality holding strictly.
QED.
Proof of Proposition 3. (i) Suppose that an information-rich equilibrium exists de-
spite (1 − ρ)yR/τ0 ≤ f0. Then S ≥ τ0 (Lemma 3), which implies ψ(Ai) = τ0/S
(Proposition 1) and Mi = τ0 (Lemma 2). Combining this with (14) and Proposition
2, we get pi = (1−ρ)y
S
R ≤ (1−ρ)y
τ0
R ≤ f0, which contradicts the equilibrium condition
pi = f and the fact that either S > τ0 or f > f0 in an information-rich economy.
This proves that S ≤ τ0 and f = f0 if (1− ρ)yR/τ0 ≤ f0. Using this in (13) - (17),
we get the unique solution derived in (ii).
(ii) In view of (13), S ≤ τ0 leads to ψ(A) = 1 so that (14) reduces to M = S and
(15) gives us S = (1− ρ)yR/f0. Moreover, ψ(A) = 1 implies, according to Lemma
2, ψ1(A)− (1− qS)(ψ1(A)−ψ2(A)) = 1 and thus ψ1(A) = ψ2(A) = 1, since ψ2(A) ≤
ψ1(A) ≤ 1. (ψ2(A) ≤ ψ1(A) follows from Assumption 5 and ψ1(A) = z(A)ψ2(A).)
Using this in Lemma 2 and in (10), we have Di = q
S + δε(1 − qS). Substituting
qS = χh/ϕ˜(h, χ) from Lemma 1, we get D0. Moreover, R = ϕ0ϕ˜(h, χ). Using this,
M = S and S = (1− ρ)yR/f0 in (11), we obtain V P . QED.
Proof of Proposition 4. (i) Suppose that an information-poor equilibrium exists,
that is, S ≤ τ0 and f = f0. Then, in view of (13), ψ(A) = 1 and, according
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to (14) and (15), M = S = (1 − ρ)yR/f0. Thus, S ≤ τ0 is a contradiction of
(1− ρ)yR/f0 > τ0.
(ii) If S ≥ τ0, then (13) and (14) imply that M = τ0. Moreover, RT = S, according
to Lemma 1. Thus, (13) - (17) reduces to ψ(A)S = τ0, (1 − ρ)yψ(A)R = fτ0 and
f ≥ f0.
(iii) Use Lemma 1, Lemma 2, (10) and Ai = A to get D. Substitute this and Mi = τ0
into (11) to prove V R. QED.
Proof of Proposition 5. In view of Proposition 4, the optimal equilibrium is given by
max
A
V R subject to f ≥ f0, where f = (1−ρ)yτ0 ψ(A)R, according to (20). According
to Assumption 5, D and thus V R are declining in A. Hence, V R is maximal at
(1−ρ)y
τ0
ψ(A)R = f0. This defines Amin. Moreover, following the line of reasoning of
Proposition 1, maxV i = y
p
(τ0Di)
1−ρ
ρ subject to Ai ≤ Amin leads to Ai = Amin. Thus,
Ai ≤ Amin implements the optimal equilibrium.
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